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Providing “Thoughtful Feedback”: Public Participation in the Regulation of Australia’s First
GM Food Crop.

The introduction of genetically modified (GM) food crops has generated considerable debate in
many countries over the role of public participation in science and technology decision-making.
In 2002 and 2003 the newly established Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR)
considered the first application for the commercial release of a GM food crop in Australia.
Despite rhetorical statements from government in support of public participation, and the
provision of various avenues for public views or knowledge to enter the decision-making process,
public input proved to be minimal. This paper offers two explanations for this: one, the inherent
limitations of public participation in a risk assessment setting, and two, the inordinate level of
discretion extended to the OGTR by the legislative framework that guides it.

Kerry Ross is a PhD candidate in the Science, Technology and Society Program at the University of
Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Gwynneville NSW 2522, Australia. Telephone: +61 2 42214408; Email
kross@uow.edu.au.
The author would like to thank Associate Professor David Mercer for his ongoing support and expertise
during the writing of this paper. I am also indebted to two anonymous referees who provided valuable
comments on previous drafts of this paper and to Professor Susan Dodds and Dr Stewart Russell.

Insufficient stakeholder consultation in the development and commercialization of GMOs in the
past has resulted in considerable questioning and public distrust, arising from ethical, political
and scientific worries…The last year has seen a realization by governments, industry bodies,
scientists and farmers that viewpoints beyond their own require accommodation, and, not to do
so is to be out of step with community expectations about how decisions about our society
should be reached. (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000-01: page 46)

This statement was contained in a 2000-2001 Australian parliamentary report that sought to
summarize some of the major issues in the development of Australia’s regulatory response to
innovations in biotechnology. Subsequent legislation, the Gene Technology Act 2000 (GTA) and the
Gene Technology Regulations 2000 (GTR) came into effect on June 21 2001 and in doing so

1

established the national Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR) to administer the new
regulatory regime. In late 2001 the newly appointed Gene Technology Regulator reaffirmed the
importance of public participation with the following statement

Science and technology are major drivers of change in our society and economy. It is important
that we increase public participation in decision making regarding their use. The Gene
Technology Act 2000, with its extensive provisions for community input, is an important forum
for such debate. (OGTR, 2001a)

In general terms the issue of public participation within the OGTR regulatory process has drawn
attention from various commentators (Chin, 2000; Hain et al, 2002; Risely, 2003; Tranter, 2003;
Schibeci et al, 2006). This paper provides a more detailed analysis by exploring the extent to which
the Australian public participated in the successful licensing process for Bayer CropScience’s
InVigor GM canola in 2002 and 2003. The Bayer application was the first to undergo the OGTR
regulatory process for the commercial release of a GM food crop in Australia i and thus provided the
first opportunity for the Australian public to participate in such a decision.

In this case study I focus on two key issues. One is the legislative framework that guides the OGTR
and requires the Regulator to consider applications within a risk assessment setting. The other is the
extent to which the provisions for public participation under the GTA were exercised by the OGTR.
Of particular importance here is the degree to which the OGTR engaged with community advisory
groups, stakeholders and the general public throughout the Bayer decision-making process. The
legislation and select documents that guide the OGTR clearly demonstrate the capacity for the
OGTR to have undertaken a broader and more rigorous approach to public participation than was
the case. This paper finds the OGTR adopted a minimalist approach to public participation by way
of what could be described as ‘discretionary slack’ embedded within the regulatory framework. The
role of the public in this decision is examined through a discussion of public submissions to the
Bayer process and the results of a Questionnaire distributed to key stakeholder groups in 2004.

Public Participation
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Commentators argue that, to some extent, efforts to implement participatory practices are obstructed
by difficulties in defining a normative concept of ‘public participation’ in the first place. In response
to this, Rowe & Frewer (2005) note that public education and public consultation can be defined in
terms of one-way communication and information flows, that is, from decision-makers to the public
or from the public to decision-makers - whereas public participation involves a two-way exchange
of information between decision-makers and the public. Sherry Arnstein’s classic essay on public
participation argues further; that participation is inadequate unless public input is genuinely
considered in the decision-making process

There is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and
having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process (Arnstein, 1969: page
217)

Arnstein constructs a typology of public participation where levels of participation correspond with
eight rungs of a ladder. Arnstein rightly notes that limiting the ‘ladder of participation’ to eight
rungs is a ‘simplification’ of real world variances, however, this simplification helps make clear the
reality of ‘gradations’ of participation. Rungs one and two are recognized as ‘nonparticipation’;
with rungs six through eight denoting a shift to ‘citizen power’. Rungs three through to five detail
the middle ground of participation, that is, the area known by Arnstein as ‘tokenism’. Level three
(Informing), level four (Consultation), and level five (Placation) allow the public varying degrees of
input into decision-making processes but do not entail a shift in power such that this public input
necessarily impacts on the process. In Arnstein’s words, it is at this level that “citizens may indeed
hear and be heard” but significantly, “they lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded”.
The shift from tokenism to citizen power begins at rung six (Partnership) where there is some
‘redistribution’ of power such that decision-makers and the public “agree to share planning and
decision-making responsibilities” through the mutual establishment of decision-making
‘groundrules’ that are not then “subject to unilateral change” (Arnstein, 1969: page 221).

For some decades now science studies scholars have turned their attention to the issue of public
participation, in most cases by focusing on how power is, or might be, redistributed in some way or
another. Nelkin & Pollak emphasise the importance of decision-makers engaging with public
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understandings early in the decision-making process; in order to ensure that public views are
included in the decision-making agenda and not merely as a response to it (Nelkin & Pollak,1979).
Efforts to ‘democratize’ science and technology range from a focus on how the process of science
and technology deliberation might empower the public (Sclove, 1995); to a re-understanding of
what constitutes meaningful knowledge in science and technology decision-making (Irwin, 1995).
Whilst the former is consistent with the development of a range of deliberative public forums, these
are often disconnected from the formal decision-making process and so there is little opportunity for
a redistribution of power (Anderson & Jaeger, 1999; Eisendel et al, 2001). The latter argument is
part of an ongoing effort to overcome the ‘deficit’ model of the public understanding of science; ii a
central feature of ongoing controversies in science and technology decision-making, particularly in
relation to the introduction of novel technologies with a high degree of scientific uncertainty, and
more particularly when the decision-making framework is reduced to a risk assessment/risk
management model.

The adoption of a risk assessment/risk management approach to decision-making is problematic for
a number of reasons. In general terms this approach tends to privilege scientific expertise with its
narrow interpretation of risk; and thus overlook more complex public understandings of risk and the
realization that notions of risk, both expert and public, are socially constructed - and not necessarily
confined to issues of ‘risk’ in any case (Levidow, 1998; Slovic, 1999; Wynne, 2001; Robins, 2001;
Mayer, 2003). As Wynne points out, this problem is self-reinforcing as scientists and decisionmakers continue to see themselves as purveyors of objective risk assessment, and continue to view
public concerns as subjective perceptions of risk that are thus marginal to the decision-making
process.

Poor risk communication is a central issue for Powell and Leis who argue that language differences
tend to reinforce the dichotomy between expert views of risk and public perceptions of risk by
constituting “barriers to mutual understanding” (1997: page 27). In contrast, good risk
communication is that which fosters a mutual exchange of information between experts and the
public in order to help “manage the tension between these two profoundly different ways of
representing risk” (Powell & Leis, 1997: page 29). This is consistent with the arguments of
Rehmann-Sutter & Vatter who go further, suggesting that the identification of significant risk issues
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may require participants who display a special type of knowledge, essentially local and contextual
knowledge they label “the competence of the specifically affected” (1996: page 220). RehmannSutter & Vatter also make a distinction between those who are undertaking the risk and those who
are having the risk imposed upon them. They argue that this provides justification for public
participation in identifying risk as those imposing a risk do not “have moral authority if those highly
affected by the risks were not allowed to participate in the deciding procedure” (1996: page 217).
These arguments echo the suggestion put forward by Slovic that risk assessment practices would
benefit greatly from increased public participation in three key ways; a more competent analysis,
increased public legitimacy, and a stronger democratic process (1999: page 689).

The OGTR and Public Participation

The OGTR was established to oversee the research and development (R&D) and the commercial
release of GMOs in Australia. It was not, however, authorized to regulate aspects of GMO use that
are administered by other agencies. For instance, Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ)
continues to oversee the safety and labeling of GM foodstuffs, and the Australian Pesticides and
Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA) continues to review the safety and ongoing use of
agricultural chemicals such as herbicides. This type of GMO regulation is commonly referred to as
a ‘gap filler’ approach in that the new regulatory body is only responsible for administering
functions that are not covered by existing agencies. According to a briefing paper commissioned by
the Australian government this type of fragmented regulatory regime has the potential for regulatory
“mishaps or oversights” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000-2001: page 15). The Australian
experience is similar to that of the EU where Levidow et al found that the UK “played a key role in
fragmenting the risk problem into separate administrative procedures – environmental safety, food
safety and herbicide usage” (1996: page 97). Such fragmentation resulted in an EU wide regulatory
regime for the environmental release of GMOs (Deliberate Release Directive 90/220) that in a UK
test case “left no one officially responsible for a range of undesirable effects which lay beyond or
spanned the existing administrative boundaries” (Levidow et al, 1996: page 98).

Fragmented approaches to GMO regulation are also significant in terms of public participation. In
2002 Bayer CropScience lodged an application with the OGTR to release 7 lines of InVigor
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herbicide resistant GM canola for commercial cropping in Australia (InVigor Canola is
genetically modified to resist the application of resistant to Bayer CropScience Liberty herbicide).
Notably, the Australian New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA), (now known as Food Standards
Australia New Zealand or FSANZ), had previously approved all 7 lines for human consumption.
Consequently, the OGTR did not independently consider any consumer health issues in relation to
the Bayer application, it simply appealed to previous decisions made by ANZFA. Similarly, public
concerns over increased herbicide use on InVigor crops or subsequent volunteer growth were not
open to public debate as the OGTR directed public concerns to APVMA. iii ANZFA and APVMA
do not have participatory mechanisms in place, so in effect the public was excluded from
participating in a range of decisions directly related to the Bayer application. The decision to
provide a ‘gap filler’ approach to GMO regulation in Australia thereby limited public participation
by reducing the scope of the OGTR decision-making process to a narrow range of very specific
issues.

According to the GTA there are four distinct categories of ‘dealings’ with GMOs for which the
OGTR is responsible. iv The Bayer decision, and thus the discussion here, is concerned with the
most regulated category, that of dealings involving the intentional release of GMOs into the
environment (known as DIR). For this category the OGTR base their licensing decision on a Risk
Assessment and Risk Management Plan (RARMP) that is prepared for each application (OGTR,
2003a). The best indication of how the OGTR determines the content of the RARMP is documented
in the Risk Analysis Framework for Licence Applications to the Office of the Gene Technology
Regulator (RAF), which is guided by the GTA and from general risk assessment principles (OGTR,
2002a). Summarized in Table 1 is the 9-stage process that is prescribed by the GTA, outlined in the
RAF, and which formed the basis of the OGTR decision-making process in the Bayer case. v

Table 1
OGTR licensing process for the intentional release of GMOs
Stage 1
The applicant must prepare ‘comprehensive’ information about all possible hazards and consequent
risks. Where possible quantitative data should be provided from contained work and early trials.
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Stage 2
An ‘Institutional Biosafety Committee’ (IBC) within the organization applying for a license must
undertake a review of the information from stage 1. This internal body must assure the Regulator of
the completeness of the proponent’s hazard identification and proposed risk management.
Stage 3
The Regulator considers whether the dealings pose ‘significant’ risk to human health or the
environment.
Stage 4
If the Regulator considers that the dealings will have ‘significant’ impact on human health and the
environment submissions must be sought from the public.
Stage 5
Irrespective of the level of risk posed the Regulator must ‘seek advice’ from the Commonwealth
Environment Minister, the Gene Technology Technical Advisory Committee (GTTAC), the States
and Territories, other Commonwealth Agencies, and appropriate local councils.
Stage 6
The Regulator ‘may’ take any other action that he or she considers necessary. This includes
literature reviews, public hearings, independent research etc.
Stage 7
The Regulator must prepare a draft Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan (RARMP). This is
based on hazards that ‘may’ be posed, the level of risk, the likelihood and consequences of the
hazard, and how any risk posed can be managed to ‘ensure that unacceptable risks are not realized’.
Stage 8
The Regulator must notify the public of the draft RARMP and call for submissions from the public
and the agencies listed in Stage 5.
Stage 9
The Regulator must consider the draft RARMP and the submissions in order to make a
determination on the application and release the final RARMP.
(OGTR, 2002: 8-11)
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Embedded in the 9 Stage licensing process are key terms that enable flexibility in setting the
boundaries of public participation. For instance, the measure of ‘significant’ at stage 3 and 4 is a
value judgment undertaken by the Regulator; and the use of ‘may’ at stage 6 hardly indicates at
which point these actions should be undertaken. Thus the OGTR has a substantial level of discretion
in determining the extent of public participation in the licensing process. This degree of
‘discretionary slack’ in the licensing process was critical in allowing the OGTR to limit and control
the conduct of public participation in the Bayer decision.

As noted in Table 1 the RAF provides avenues for general public participation, including
stakeholder groups, throughout the process. The OGTR can engage with the public at Stage 4, Stage
6, and Stage 8, although Stage 8 is the only point at which the OGTR must call for public
submissions. Moreover, the OGTR has the capacity to undertake public hearings and commission
independent research at Stage 6 in which case there is scope for deliberative type procedures or
non-industry knowledge to enter the process. In the Bayer case, despite this being the first GM food
crop to come before the OGTR and the first opportunity for the public to engage with this new
decision-making process, Stage 8 was the only point at which the OGTR engaged with the public by
undertaking the mandatory public submission process. Moreover, the OGTR did not commission
any independent studies as per Stage 6 of the process vi to investigate the background of either the
applicant or the particular GM crops under review.

As the public submissions were not called for until the final stage of the decision-making process
the framing of the assessment had already been decided upon - in which case any new issues raised
by the public could not be addressed. This is made clear in the OGTR ‘Summary of Public
Submissions’ which forms appendix 10 in the final RARMP (OGTR, 2003a: pages 150-6). The
appendix lists eleven ‘types of issue’ that were raised in the public submissions. Issues deemed
“Outside the Scope of Assessment” were identified as; ‘Agricultural practices’, ‘Economic/market
issues’, and ‘Other general issues’. In relation to these the RARMP states

Public submissions raised a number of issues, such as impacts on domestic and export
markets, costs and adequacy of segregation protocols, liability and impacts on organic
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status, that are outside the scope of the evaluations conducted under the Act and therefore
could not be considered as part of the assessment process. (OGTR, 2003a: page 151

“Issues which are the responsibility of other agencies” included; ‘Safety and labeling of GM foods’
and ‘Herbicide use and resistance management’ (OGTR, 2003a: page 151) in which case the public
was directed to FSANZ and AVPMA for more information. Those issues that fell within the
framing of the assessment: ‘General Health concerns’; ‘Precaution and general safety’; ‘General
environmental concerns’; ‘Pollen flow and contamination’; ‘Herbicide resistant weeds’; and
‘Applicant suitability’ were noted and the OGTR referred to amendments in the final RARMP that
provided more information on these issues. The OGTR did not engage with the public regarding
these latter issues as such, but adopted a ‘deficit model' by assuming that giving the public more
information was an adequate response.

This deficit model of the public understanding of science is indicative of the general relationship
between the OGTR and the public. For example, a Fact Sheet on the OGTR website entitled, Public
Participation in the Assessment of Gene Technology illustrates the extent to which the OGTR
‘informs’ the public regarding GMO applications. According to the Fact Sheet, the public can;
receive notification of an application, the public can ‘comment’ on the draft RARMP, the public can
access the OGTR website, the public can read a licensing application in the OGTR office, or the
public can nominate to be on the OGTR mailing list. In other words, apart from the restrictive
submission process outlined above, the flow of information is from the OGTR to the public.

This continues after the OGTR has handed down its decision. The GTA defines reviewable
decisions as those that refuse a license, suspend a license, or otherwise restrict or impose conditions
upon a license (Gene Technology Act, Section 179, Review of decisions). There is no review
process in the case of a license being granted. Moreover, only the license holder can call for a
review. This effectively cuts off any exchange between the OGTR and the public once a decision
has been made. This not only limits the capacity for the public, including neighboring landowners,
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to challenge a decision that they have legitimate concerns about, but restricts the capacity for new
information to flow to the Regulator should unknown affects be discovered in the future.

In addition to the public submission process the OGTR can also draw information from two public
advisory bodies, the Gene Technology Ethics Committee (GTEC) and the Gene Technology
Community Consultative Committee (GTCCC). vii A third advisory body, the Gene Technology
Technical Advisory Committee (GTTAC) essentially provides scientific advice to the OGTR. What
is notable here is that according to the GTA and the RAF the OGTR must consult with the GTTAC,
however, whilst it may consult with the GTEC or the GTCCC, it is not obliged to do so. (GTA,
section 112 and section 107). Although the GTTAC must include one member each from the GTEC
and the GTCCC, the role of ethics or community concerns are nonetheless marginalized unless the
OGTR chooses to consult with them. In the Bayer decision the final 185 page RARMP does not
contain any reference to either the GTEC or the GTCCC, nor do they appear in the list of acronyms
of institutions participating in the process, suggesting that the OGTR did not consult them in this
particular decision. Indeed, following a meeting on February 20 2003, in response to the Bayer
application but some five months before the final decision, the GTCCC had released the following
statement:

The GTCCC expresses concern that a state of community unreadiness exists concerning the
risks to the environment of the commercial release of GM canola, so significant that the
applications should be denied at this time. (GeneEthics, 2003: page 1)

Given the lack of input from the public and non-technical advisory bodies in the Bayer decision it
becomes evident that the process was predominantly informed by industry expertise. The
significance of this situation can be found in the Explanatory Memo that accompanied the Gene
Technology Bill 2000. This document notes that the reliance on industry to fully disclose issues
regarding GMOs was a major inadequacy of the previous voluntary system (GMAC) that preceded
the OGTR:
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There are difficulties in relying upon industry to provide the necessary information and
make appropriate risk assessment and management decisions. This is because, in an
objective aggregate sense, it may not be in their best interests to draw the possibility of risk
to the attention of prospective consumers and the community more generally.
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2000: page 12)

Clearly, although industry no longer make risk assessment and risk management decisions, in
considering Stage 1 and 2 of the licensing process, they continue to ‘provide the necessary
information’ in the early framing stages of the OGTR process and thus continue to inform the basis
of subsequent risk assessment and risk management decisions. viii

The primary objective of the OGTR is to establish a national regulatory system:
To protect the health and safety of people, and to protect the environment, by identifying
risks posed by or as a result of gene technology, and by managing those risks through
regulating certain dealings with GMOs (Gene Technology Act, Section 2, Object of Act).

This concern with identifying and minimizing the risks associated with biotechnology is to be
expected, however, in practice, the OGTR interprets its role in such a way as to resist engaging with
public views by insisting that a scientific understanding of specific risk issues is the only way this
objective can be realized:

It should be noted that risk assessment is a scientific process that does not take political or
other non-scientific aspects of an application to a GMO into account (OGTR, 2002a: page
12)

This statement contradicts the procedural intent of the Gene Technology Regulations though, which
directs the OGTR to pursue a regulatory process that:
•

Continue[s] a science based approach to the assessment of risks but including capacity for
formal consideration of broader issues such as ethics.

11

•

Be more responsive to stakeholders and community views consistent with the legislation.
(OGTR, 2001b: page 4)

On announcing the decision to issue a license for Bayer InVigor canola the Regulator paid tribute
to the “input” from experts in this decision, suggesting that these experts contributed to the decision
in some way. In the same sentence, the Regulator also paid tribute to the public for their “thoughtful
feedback”, a strong indication that the Regulator saw public participation as a reaction to the risk
assessment process, rather than a contributing factor (OGTR, 2003b).

Brief Summary of the OGTR Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan for InVigor
Canola

The following summary and critique of this process provides a basic understanding of the InVigor
canola Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan in order to provide a foundation on which to
discuss the public response to this document. Reflecting stage 7 outlined above, the final RARMP
assessed the following hazards:

•

Human health and Safety – Toxicity and Allergenicity

•

Environmental Safety – Toxicity to other organism

•

Environmental Safety – Weediness

•

Environmental Safety – Transfer of introduced genes to other organisms

•

Herbicide Resistance

The risk assessment process carried out in regards to InVigor canola looked at the likelihood of
these hazards to pose a risk to human health or the environment. The risks to human health and the
environment are assessed as being either: ‘negligible’, ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘moderate’, ‘high’, or
‘very high’. The process considered the hazards according to; ‘the likelihood of the hazard
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occurring’, or the ‘likely consequences of the hazard, were it realized’, it also canvassed the risk
management options to ‘mitigate any significant hazards’ (OGTR, 2003a: page 27).

Human health and Safety – Toxicity and Allergenicity

The OGTR used a range of studies to identify the likelihood and consequences of toxic or allergenic
hazards posed by InVigor canola to human health. These included; traditional toxicology tests in
animals and analysis of any changes to proteins expressed or levels of toxicants or allergenics as
compared to conventional canola. The assessment found: the proteins expressed by InVigor
canola are not ‘similar’ to known toxins and are ‘rapidly degenerated by mammalian digestive
systems’ ix and that allergenic risks were ‘unlikely’ because humans are already exposed to the
proteins in InVigor in the environment. As a result of these studies and other evidence the OGTR
assessment concluded that the toxicological or allergenic risks of InVigor canola to human health
were ‘very low’ and as a result “risks are considered negligible and it not considered necessary to
impose any management conditions” (OGTR, 2003a: Executive Summary).

Environmental Safety – Toxicity to other organism

In this section the RARMP considered the risks posed by InVigor canola to: grazing animals,
native animals, animal feed safety, insects, and soil bacteria. This assessment again looked at: the
toxicity of novel proteins expressed by InVigor, and the toxicity of herbicide metabolites. The
OGTR listed a large number of findings that “strongly supports the conclusion that the GM
canola…will not present a toxicity or allergenicity hazard to any organism” (OGTR, 2003a: page
76). These included that the: ‘the composition of the 7 GM canola lines does not differ significantly
from non-GM canola’, ‘proteins produced are rapidly degraded by mammalian digestion’, no ‘antinutritional’ effects noted in sheep or pigs, ‘no adverse impacts on foraging bees, and ‘there are no
reports of adverse effects…on native animals or birds in Australia or commercial production in
North America.’ The OGTR again concluded that “the risks are considered negligible and it is not
considered necessary to impose any management conditions” (OGTR, 2003a: Executive Summary).
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Environmental Safety – Weediness

This element of the risk assessment looked at whether InVigor canola had the potential to be more
invasive or persistent than non-GM canola in the environment. (‘Volounteer’ plants, or weeds, both
on the farm and in surrounding areas, are seen as a normal function of farming) The RARMP states
that InVigor is no more likely to invade the environment than non-GM canola as it can be
controlled by alternate herbicides and farm management practices (alternate to applications of
Liberty herbicide). The RARMP ‘recommends’ that a farmer growing InVigor ‘notify’ the
adjoining landowner. However, the recommendation to notify adjoining farmers is problematic – if
for any reason they are not notified they will be ignorant of the need to take alternate management
steps to address the issue of weediness. Despite this the assessment concludes

As the risk that the GM canola lines will be more likely than conventional canola to spread
in the environment, and result in more detrimental environmental impact is negligible, no
management conditions are required. (OGTR, 2003a: page 94)

Environmental Safety – Transfer of introduced genes to other organisms

In this section the OGTR identifies two hazards that are of particular concern, the transfer of genes
to other plants related to canola, and the transfer of genes to other organisms including humans.
(This is known as horizontal transfer.) The assessment acknowledges that there will be varying
levels of gene transfer between InVigor canola and other canola and canola related species.
However, it dismisses this concern by arguing that the same safety conclusions and management
practices proposed for InVigor will apply. The assessment does however, address the critical issue
of multiple herbicide resistant plants. This has been documented in Canada with GM crops
transferring herbicide resistant genes to other GM crops with different herbicide resistance. x The
RARMP admits that multiple herbicide resistance is ‘inevitable’ but that it can be managed through
the use of 2,4-D and with strict adherence to Bayer’s ‘Crop Management Plan.’ (CMP). The Bayer
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CMP recommends that farmers minimize the risk of multiple herbicide tolerance in volounteers by
creating buffer zones and notifying neighbouring landowners of crop details. In the end, the
prevention or control of multiple herbicide resistant canola may prove difficult as genes do not
respect farm boundaries and again the Bayer CMP only ‘recommends’ that GM farmers notify their
neighbours in this regard, it does not insist they do. The assessment concludes that risk posed to
human health and the environment by gene transfer to related species is ‘negligible’ to ‘very low’.

In assessing the risk of genes being transferred to unrelated organisms, including humans, the
OGTR makes a number of crucial assumptions. It states for instance that

there are no known mechanisms whereby horizontal gene transfer could occur between plant
and mammalian cells, therefore primary consideration will be given to the possibility of
transfer from GM plants to microorganisms xi

The RARMP does go on to state however, that:

Theoretically, horizontal gene transfer from GM canola to other organisms, including
humans and microorganisms is possible, but it is extremely unlikely. (OGTR, 2003a:
page128)

Another assumption is made soon after when the possibility of gene transfer from GM crops to
grazing animals, via gut bacteria, is said to have, “received little attention, largely because free
DNA has been considered unlikely to survive.” (OGTR, 2003a: page 129) In the end the conclusion
is that the ‘likelihood’ of gene transfer to other organisms, including humans, is ‘considered
negligible’ because: there is ‘limited probability of occurrence’, ‘natural events of horizontal gene
transfer to distantly related organisms are extremely rare’ and ‘horizontal gene transfer has
generally been achieved only under highly controlled experimental conditions and with related gene
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sequences’ (OGTR, 2003a: page 132-3) Once again, there are no ‘management conditions’ imposed
by the OGTR in relation to these risks.

Herbicide Resistance
In this section of the Assessment the OGTR acknowledges that there is potential for herbicide
resistant weeds to develop. However, according to the RARMP this will only occur if Liberty
herbicide is used ‘inappropriately’. As herbicide use is administered by APVMA, ‘no specific
conditions are imposed in the licence in relation to management of herbicide resistance’ other than
adherence to APVMA protocols (OGTR, 2003a: page 134). In turn, the APVMA is satisfied that
implementation of Bayer’s CMP “will provide effective management of the development of
herbicide resistance” (OGTR, 2003a: page 134).

The public and the OGTR process

The public submission process to the draft Bayer RARMP (Stage 8) began on April 1 2003 and
ended on May 26 2003. Appendix 10 of the final RARMP lists and summarizes a total of 256 public
submissions. Contained within this number are 5 petitions and 8 campaign letters that represent
more than 1000 additional signatures however, these are not listed separately and so their impact is
lost. Assessing the content of public submissions to the Bayer application proved extremely difficult
as the OGTR did not publish the submissions (this also raises concern about how the OGTR may
have categorized the submissions in Appendix 10 of the final RARMP). The OGTR was contacted
in relation to this matter and replied that:

The OGTR is not in the practice of releasing submissions on RARMPs as they contain
personal names and addresses. Hence for privacy reasons submissions are not released…In
addition, and from a logistical perspective, any one RARMP may receive a significant of
submissions, sometimes as many as several hundred. xii
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This statement is at odds with a number of similar public submission processes in which the identity
and/or content of submissions have been released. Indeed there is a history of public disclosure in a
number of related debates suggesting that it is commonplace for government agencies in Australia
to publish submissions and/or the identity of those who participated. xiii

Keeping these limitations in mind, the analysis presented here draws on the submissions of 5 key
stakeholder groups that were accessed via an internet search: Greenpeace; Network of Concerned
Farmers (NCF); GeneEthics; the Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA); and the
Australian Consumers Association (ACA). This was complemented by an online Questionnaire sent
to each of these groups in mid 2004. (See Appendix 1 for list of questions) All of the groups listed
here responded to the 15 questions and the results are detailed at the conclusion of this discussion.
The 5 submissions can be seen as a representative sample of views within the broader public as a
recent study by the Australia Institute argues that NGOs such as these play an important role in
representing public views in Australia (Maddison et al, 2004). Moreover, it is evident from the
OGTR’s categorization of the submissions that in most instances the concerns raised by the
submissions of individual members of the public were the same concerns expressed by
environmental, consumer and public interest groups such as those examined here (OGTR, 2003a:
page 150-6). It is beyond the scope of this paper to comment on whether the views expressed in the
submissions are sound, rather, I briefly present the key themes from the submissions in order to
indicate the types of concerns raised by the public in response to the Bayer RARMP.

The submissions detailed below are briefly summarized in Table 2 with URLs for each submission
listed among the references.

Table 2
Summary of stakeholder submissions
•

Greenpeace - A very comprehensive submission that addresses all of the major issues raised in
the draft RARMP in detail; the submission is particularly critical of poor scientific practices in
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the OGTR assessment. This submission was based, in large part, on peer reviewed scientific
studies that conflicted with the studies used by the OGTR.
•

Network of Concerned Farmers (NCF) – Primarily concerned with the impact of GM crops
on conventional farming this submission also addresses a broad range of GM issues raised in the
RARMP. NCF essentially argued that the GM risk to human health and the environment cannot
be assessed in isolation from social, political, and economic issues.

•

GeneEthics – This submission criticizes a number of key shortcomings by the OGTR decisionmaking process and details Bayer’s history of non-compliance in Australia, arguing they are not
fit to hold a license.

•

The Institute of Health and Environmental Research – under the auspices of the Public
Health Association of Australia (PHAA) – A well researched submission that does not limit
itself to human health issues but also addresses environmental concerns as raised in the draft
RARMP, and is critical of the lack of scientific rigor in the assessment. This submission is
similar to that of Greenpeace in that it counters the industry basis of the OGTR risk assessment
with peer reviewed scientific studies.

•

Australian Consumer Association (ACA) – Claiming a neutral stance on GM, this submission
is critical of the narrow scope of the OGTR assessment and its failure to protect consumers
through a more comprehensive, independent process.

The public submissions challenged the narrow framing of the issues by the OGTR and put forward
their own understandings of the Bayer application by appealing to counter-expertise and lay
knowledge and understandings. xiv In most cases the public submissions were concerned with the
Regulator’s narrow definition of the terms ‘human health’ and ‘environment’. The Regulator’s
definition of environment is reflected in a Senate Estimate Report that detailed questioning between
the Regulator and Senator Cherry in late 2003. xv

Senator Cherry – Coming back to the issue of the environment, are you operating under
any policy instructions from government as to what is and is not the environment for the
purposes of the act?
Regulator – No, the definition of the environment that we use is the one that is in the Gene
Technology Act
18

Senator Cherry – But that does not exclude the notion of a neighboring farm environment,
for example?
Regulator – It would only include a neighbouring farm environment in the context of
whether or not there was a risk to human health and safety in the environment.
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2003: page 151)

The Regulator appears to have framed the environment in terms of whether there is risk to human
health in the environment rather than that which is the objective of the GTA, that is, a consideration
of human health and the environment. For the purposes of regulation the GTA defines the
environment in much broader terms than does the OGTR:
(a) Ecosystems and their constituent parts; and
(b) Natural and physical resources; and
(c) The qualities and characteristics of locations, places and areas. (GTA, section 10, Definitions,
(1) environment)

The narrow interpretation of the ‘environment’ by the OGTR was commented on in most of the
submissions, with the PHAA stating:

To the OGTR, “the environment” seems to be just natural, undisturbed ecosystems, of which
there is very little remaining in Australia. The rest of Australia, including agricultural lands,
disturbed lands, or roadside verges do not seem to be included in the definition, despite
being parts of the Australian environment. (PHAA, 2003: page 1)

The Greenpeace submission challenged the scientific basis of the OGTR claims by pointing out
many of the studies in the RARMP were industry funded and/or unpublished, and countering these
with independent peer reviewed research. Additionally, Greenpeace identified a number of
instances in which the RARMP quoted studies that did not support the particular claim for which
they were cited. Moreover, although Greenpeace recognised APVMA as the appropriate body to
licence the use of herbicides, it argued that the human health and environmental impact of herbicide
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use on GM crops was the concern of the OGTR and should therefore have been independently
assessed by the OGTR.

The NCF submission was also concerned about the tendency for the Regulator to take a very narrow
view of the environment. An OGTR study cited in the Bayer RARMP showed that GM
contamination of canola type plants could occur up to 2.6 km from a GM crop (OGTR, 2002b: page
13). Therefore, if GM canola were to be introduced in Australia it may become impossible for
surrounding farmers to claim GM free status and could also lead to liability issues between the
biotechnology industry and individual farmers xvi. In this case the OGTR considered the
contamination of conventional or organic canola crops an economic imposition rather than an
environmental risk and therefore simply stated that it was beyond the scope of its assessment.
Greenpeace and the NCF on the other hand, argued that this scenario is an environmental issue that
leads to an economic imposition.

In the same way the definition of ‘human health’ according to the Regulator was extremely limited.
In the same Senate Estimates hearing as detailed above the Regulator was asked:

Senator Cherry – What research have you commissioned in the issue of human health
effects of GM crops?
Regulator – Directly, we have not commissioned research. Obviously FSANZ does a lot of
work in assessing food products.
Senator Cherry – But they have commissioned no research either.
Regulator – I am not aware of what they have done, but there is obviously a great deal of
data.
Following further discussion:
Senator Cherry – What does human health mean under your Act then?
Regulator – It can be things to do with occupational health and safety issues. For example,
as I said earlier, exposure to the crop…it is human health outside the food side of things. xvii

With a focus then on occupational exposure the PHAA submission was particularly critical of
studies cited in the RARMP that were either weak or not designed to inform human health matters.
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For instance, the OGTR relied on a statement by Bayer that employees and contractors in daily
contact with GE canola plants, “have not shown changed allergic reactions (as compared to the nonGM canola) in annual medical examinations.” (OGTR, 2003a: page 66) The PHAA noted that there
was no pre-employment measurement with which to compare these findings, nor was there any
indication of what tests were conducted during the medical examinations. The PHAA went on to
state:

Only a properly conducted epidemiological study on a large number of people can determine
the relationship between exposure to InVigor canola and adverse health. (PHAA, 2003:
page 8)

The Public Response to the Bayer Decision-Making Process – the Questionaire

As noted earlier, one of the problems in assessing the impact of public views in the Bayer decision
was the failure of the OGTR to make the submissions publicly available. In response to the
Questionnaire (see Appendix 1) all of the groups agreed that the submissions should be publicly
available, with one group arguing that industry submissions should also be released (the question of
anonymity bought a mixed response). In replying to the Questionnaire the groups also made a
number of suggestions toward improving the decision-making process. These included: the need for
more accountability in the process; the need for public views to be valued; the need for the GTCCC
to engage more with the public; and the need for public hearings and forums to be a mandatory part
of the decision-making process. Furthermore, the Questionnaire also raised the problematic nature
of reducing decisions to a risk assessment. The suggestions made by the groups in response to this
included: the need to assess ‘real world’ risk; the importance of quantifying the desire/need for GM
crops; the idea that the decision-making process should be more than an avenue for voicing
concerns; and the lack of debate over the benefits of GM crops, and whether they outweigh the
risks. In the end none of the groups discussed here received a substantive reply to the concerns
raised in their submission, although two claimed to have received a ‘standard’ reply.

There was a belief among some of those who responded to the Questionnaire that the Regulator had
already made a decision prior to the call for public submissions. Moreover, one group suggested
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that the submission process was a mechanism for dispersing the energy of those who have concerns
about GM crops, with another group agreeing that it was a way of channeling public views without
recognizing them. The negative views of these groups toward the OGTR process could well be
understood as a reflection of their opposition to the Bayer decision. Yet given the minimal way in
which the OGTR engaged with the public, and the understanding of the issues evident in the
submissions, one could also argue that there is a reasonable basis to these views.

The actions of the OGTR in relation to public participation in the Bayer decision are not restricted
to this decision alone, but have implications for the future of public participation in the OGTR
process. All of the respondents to the questionnaire sent out in mid 2004 indicated that they did not
believe that their participation in the Bayer decision was worthwhile – and each group was
convinced that the OGTR ignored all of their concerns. When asked whether they felt their
experience or expertise was valued in the OGTR process, again the response from all was an
emphatic no. Despite this, a number of the groups planned to continue to engage with the OGTR,
albeit in a reduced capacity, simply to maintain contact with the process. The remainder felt that as
their submissions did not appear to have impacted on the process they would not make future
submissions but would direct their activities into other areas that engage with the GM crop debate.
A number of those who responded to the Questionnaire also expressed concern about the need to
submit separate submissions for each application to the OGTR as the submissions are quite detailed
and take some time to prepare.

Certainly the public has its own expectations of what participation should look like in
biotechnology decision-making. In March of 1999 the Australian Consumer’s Association initiated
Australia’s first Consensus Conference on ‘Gene Technology in the Food Chain’ (Report). One of
the key recommendations in the Lay Report was contained in Section 2, Processes of Decisionmaking:

Government should establish a mechanism similar to the model of the Consensus
Conference, to bring together consisting of industry, consumer groups, critics, other experts
and Australian lay people. This would ensure that dialogue between all of these groups
would lead to better government decisions. (Australian Museum, 1999)
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This is consistent with the views expressed both by commentators such as Chin (2000: page 535)
and those who, in responding to the Questionnaire, proposed the conduct of ‘public hearings and
forums to be a mandatory part of the decision-making process’. Indeed, it was claimed that the
GTCCC was generated in response to this recommendation from the Consensus Conference
(IOGTR 2000). There are two problems with this though: one, the GTCCC is not a 'mechanism
similar to the model of the Consensus Conference' as the public does not determine, or engage in,
discussion as in the Consensus Conference model; and two, as detailed above, the GTCCC is
marginalised in the OGTR process and so fails in its function to promote dialogue between public
groups and decision-makers in any case.

Conclusion

Returning to Arnstein’s model as a measure of public participation this paper clearly shows that the
Australian public did not engage with the OGTR decision-making process in the Bayer decision
beyond the level of tokenism. In other words, the public submission process allowed the public to
‘hear and be heard’ but did not involve a redistribution of power such that public views were
necessarily included or heeded throughout the process, or indeed, in response to it. This is, to some
extent, consistent with criticisms of decision-making within a risk setting as it is evident that the
OGTR engaged with expert views throughout the process but tended to adopt a deficit model when
communicating with the public. Moreover, there did not appear to be any middle ground in relation
to the communication of risk as the decision-makers and the public displayed very different views
on the range and complexity of risks associated with the commercial release of InVigor canola.
The contribution to this paper from those who responded to the Questionaire confirm Slovic’s
argument that more rigorous public participation would increase public acceptance and legitimacy
of decisions and make for a stronger democratic process; arguably, it could also have led to a more
competent analysis in this case. The Australian government has recently (2005) undertaken a public
review of the operations of the Gene Technology Act 2000, including the efficacy of public
participation in the OGTR decision-making process. This review was an important opportunity to
improve public participation under the GTA and it is hoped that its outcome will be the subject of
future studies into the role of the Australian public in science and technology decision-making.
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Notes
i

The governance of GMOs in Australia underwent major changes in 2001. The previous voluntary systems,
the Interim Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (IOGTR) and its predecessor, the Gene Manipulation
Advisory Committee (GMAC) were replaced by a nationally consistent, compulsory process administered by
the OGTR. The role of the OGTR is to regulate GMO dealings under the Gene Technology Act 2000 (GTA),
and according to the Gene Technology Regulations 2001 (GTR), and to provide information to other
regulatory agencies and the public. The OGTR does not determine decisions as such, but supports the Gene
Technology Regulator (Regulator) in making decisions according to the GTA. Prior to the Bayer decision the
only GM crops released into the Australian environment were GM cotton and GM carnations.
ii
For example, see the large body of ongoing work by Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne.
iii
For example, at some points in the RARMP the OGTR does identify risk hazards and yet as they do not
pose a direct threat to human health or the environment they are not considered risks for the purposes of
regulation and are thus passed on to these other agencies. In this regard there is much criticism of the fact
that FSANZ does not have an adequate process in place to conduct rigorous assessment of the risks of GMOs
in the food chain. See Hain et al, page 177. See also NSW Hansard, Interim Report: Genetically Modified
Food, Standing Committee on State Development, p 1, which notes that rather than develop an innovative
approach to regulation, “ANZFA [previous title for FSANZ] merely assesses GE foods from data supplied
by corporations promoting the technology.”
iv
The four dealings are as follows: 1) ‘Exempt dealings with GMOs’ – that is GMOs that are exempt from
licensing due to their known negligible risk; 2) ‘Notifiable low risk dealings with GMOs’ (NLRD) – GMOs
that are deemed low risk provided they are contained within certified facilities, they must also be listed on
the GMO register; 3) ‘Licensed dealings with GMOs’ – includes all dealings with GMOs that do not fit the
above categories and require a case by case consideration by the Gene Technology Regulator. These dealings
are licensed in two ways, a) Dealings not involving intentional release of GMOs (DNIR) includes those
dealings where the risks are less understood and where the GMOs must be confined to a contained system,
and b) Dealings involving intentional release of GMOs (DIR) includes those dealings where the intention is
to release the GMO into the environment. This category must undergo a more rigorous licensing process than
DNIR dealings and thus requires more data to be submitted for assessment.
v
This was the decision-making process at the time of the Bayer decision. As will be noted in the conclusion,
a review of the GTA was held in 2005 however, this study does not comment on the changes to the decisionmaking process since this time.
vi
The reference list in the final RARMP for Bayer InVigor GM canola does contain three studies
commissioned by the OGTR, however, these were not commissioned in response to the Bayer application
and so cannot be said to address the particular concerns raised by this application. For detail see OGTR,
2003a, Reference list – Agronico (2002), OGTR (2002a) & Rieger (2002).
vii
The GTEC and the GTCCC are made up of representatives from: environmental groups, consumer groups,
farmers, industry stakeholders, local council representatives, social scientists, media representatives,
ethicists, ecologists, law academics, and philosophers.
viii
Bayer or the biotechnology industry undertook many studies cited in the RARMP. Moreover, a number of
studies were either unpublished or had not undergone peer review. For more detail see the following
submissions, Greenpeace, Network of Concerned Farmers, and the Public Health Association of Australia.
ix
OGTR, RARMP:56. This was not based on human testing but on a 14 day mouse study and a 10 day rat
study that was criticised in at least four of the submissions made to the OGTR.
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x

OGTR, RARMP:96-8. In this instance the assessment states that the risk of gene transfer between cultivated
canola crops is ‘high’. See also Op Cit, OGTR RARMP Executive Summary. This phenomenon is well
documented in scientific and lay literature. See for instance, Huxham M., and Sumner, D., Science and
Environmental Decision Making, Prentice Hall, London, 2000, who outline the impact of gene transfer and
mutation on the function of GM crops.
xi
OGTR, RARMP:126. By microorganisms the RARMP is referring to bacteria.
xii
Email correspondence between the author and the OGTR, 3 February 2004.
xiii
There are many examples of public submissions being released into the public domain, including those
listed in the Senate Committee Report on the Gene Technology Bill. In this case all organizations and
individuals who made written submissions as well as all witnesses who appeared at public hearings were
listed in Appendix 1 and 2 of the Senate Committee Report, A Cautionary Tale: Fish Don’t Lay Tomatoes.
xiv
In general, the submissions challenged the scientific basis of the claims made by the OGTR in the
RARMP, in large part by noting that much of the OGTR analysis was based on industry funded or nonpublished data rather than independent peer reviewed research.
xv
In 2003 Senator Cherry was a Democrat Senator for Queensland.
xvi
A 2002 study details that since the introduction of GM crops in Canada the organic industry has
disappeared in some areas and many conventional canola growers have been forced to grow GM canola in
order to protect themselves against legal challenges from the biotech industry for breach of intellectual
property rights (Warwick and Meziani, 2002).
xvii
Commonwealth of Australia, 2003, p 159.The act is ambiguous in relation to human health and does not
provide a tangible definition. Gene Technology Act, section 51, Matters Regulator Must Take Into Account
In Preparing Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan, (1a) states that in preparing the risk assessment
the Regulator must ‘take into account’ “the risks posed by those dealings, including any risks to the health
and safety of people”. The Regulator must also ‘take into account’ (1b) “any submission made under Section
49 (3c) in relation to such risks.” Section 49 (3c) is that which relates to “written submissions on whether the
license should be issued, being submissions about matters that the Regulator is required to take into
account”. Those matters the Regulator must take into account are Section 51 (1a) above and also Section 51
(2a), “the means of managing any risks posed by those dealings in such a way as to protect: (2a) (i) the health
and safety of people.” These circular guidelines under the Act gives no clear indication of what should be
considered in assessing the risk to human health, rather, it is left to the Regulator to interpret the definition of
Human Health according to these guidelines.
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Appendix 1
Questionaire Regarding the OGTR and DIR 021/2002 (Bayer InVigor canola)
Question 1
At what point did you or your organisation actively engage with the OGTR process in regards to DIR
021/2002? Did you participate prior to the release of the draft RARMP, or was the submission you made
regarding this document the first opportunity for you to participate in the OGTR decision-making process?
Question 2
Did the OGTR fail to identify or address any issues of importance to you or your organisation in the DIR
021/2002 decision-making process? If so, what were they.
Question 3
Do you consider that your participation in the OGTR decision-making process regarding DIR 021/2002 was
worthwhile? Please elaborate.
Question 4
Do you believe the public participation model adopted by the OGTR in regards to DIR 021/2002 was
adequate? If not, how do you think public participation in the OGTR decision-making process could be
improved?
Question 5
Will you or your organization continue to take part in the formal OGTR decision-making process regarding
the release of GMOs into the environment? Why or why not?
Question 6
Did you receive a reply from the OGTR to your submission regarding DIR 021/2002? If so, did the reply
specifically address the issues raised in your submission?
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Question 7
Do you think that submissions made to the OGTR by the public should be publicly available? If so, should
those making the submission have the option of remaining anonymous?
Question 8
What types of scientific evidence or expertise did you or your organisation rely on to support your
submission?
Question 9
What types of experience or expertise did you or your organisation bring to the debate in relation to DIR
021/2002?
Question 10
Do you think your experience or expertise was valued in the OGTR decision-making process regarding DIR
021/2002?
Question 11
Having taken part in the formal OGTR decision-making process regarding DIR 021/2002 have you or your
organisation reviewed your actions? If so, what will you do differently in the future?
Question 12
Are there any other issues in relation to public participation in the OGTR decision-making process that you
wish to raise here?
Question 13
Other than the submission you made to the OGTR regarding DIR 021/2002, did you or your organisation
participate in this debate in any other way? If so, please explain briefly the type of action you undertook and
at what point in the debate you did so, and why. ( ie were you already active in the general GMO debate or
did you mobilise in response to this particular decision.)
Question 14
On a scale of 1 – 10, with 10 being the highest risk, where would you rate the risks associated with the
commercial release of InVigor GM canola? Why?
Question 15
The OGTR decision-making process is based on a Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan. Do you
think that this type of process is an adequate method for making decisions regarding the use of GMOs? If
not, do you think that decision-making regarding the use of GMOs should be based on socially acceptable
outcomes? For example, debate about whether or not Australia should adopt gene technologies in agriculture
in general.
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